The Reed Elsevier stock price gap by Kamp, B.
Abstract: This is the report of a limited study on the
structural stock price differences between Reed and
Elsevier. The purpose of this study is to provide an
overview of the problem area and to formulate and discuss
several hypotheses regarding the causes of this gap. 
The research was performed by interviewing bankers,
financial analysts, academics and the Director Corporate
Finance of Reed-Elsevier. Statistical evaluation was not
the primary goal. A solution of the gap problem is not yet
found.
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1. Introduction
Reed-Elsevier is a combination of public listed companies in the
publishing industry.
It is a combination of the British publisher Reed International
and the Dutch publisher Elsevier NV. 
On Thursday, 17 September, 1992 the two companies announced their
intention to merge their operations. It was agreed that the merger
would take place on equal terms. Both Elsevier and Reed would
obtain a 50% interest in the combined activities. However, in view
of Reed's larger market capitalization Elsevier would issue a
certain number of shares and hand them over to Reed.
Based on a NLG/GBP exchange rate of NLG 2.74 Elsevier gave Reed a
5.8% interest in its share capital and one Elsevier share has
equivalent rights to 7.69 Reed shares.
The 5.8% reflects a valuation ratio of approximately 52.9 : 47.1 .
The equalisation ratio of 7.69 is based on this valuation and is 
calculated as:
52.9         47.1
----    x  Equalisation ratio = -----
 R     E
where
R (the number of Reed shares) =  568,403,622 ; 
E (the number of Elsevier shares)=  65,814,744 ; 
This resulted in the following finance structure:Thus, the separate shares of Reed and Elsevier remained. Reed
shares are mainly traded in London, Elsevier shares are mainly
traded in Amsterdam. Merger arrangements were based on equality to
ensure equal rights to both kinds of shareholders. This resulted
in an equal dividend policy and equal rights to the assets of the
combination, measured against actual exchange rates. 
Special care has been taken that different tax regulations in the
United Kingdom versus the Netherlands would result in an equal
gross-dividend. 
Given these equalisation arrangements one may expect that the
share prices of Reed and Elsevier tend to approach a 1 to 7.69
ratio, taking actual exchange rates into account.
In practice however, there seems to be a structural difference in
the ratio of the share prices with respect to the expected ratio,
with Elsevier shares trading at a lower than theoretical price.
This discount between Reed and Elsevier prices is called the
"gap".
In the literature no study on the Reed-Elsevier gap has been
found. In this paper I will present some characteristics of this
gap and discuss some hypotheses which could explain it. The
objective of this report is to give an overview of possible causes
of the gap. In this report, research into specific hypotheses is
of limited extent.
1.1 Methodology
Several hypotheses about the causes of the gap were derived and
formulated from discussions with financial professionals, and from
literature on corporate finance. In the literature, no other
publications on the Reed-Elsevier gap were found. This study is
therefore meant to provide an introductionary view of the problem.
The derived hypotheses are illustrated with Reed-Elsevier data and
commented. Although some graphics and correlations are presented,
this study is not intended to be statistical.
The hypotheses can be divided into two main groups: distortion of
the equalisation arrangements and obstacles to arbitrage. 
Distortion of the equalisation arrangements: The merger mechanics
were designed to make Reed shares and Elsevier shares fully
economic substitutable. Rights and dividends were made equal.
However, it may be possible that there are more aspects thanrights and dividends that influence the value of the shares.   
Obstacles to arbitrage: There may be characteristics of financial
markets which prohibit the gap to be resolved.
First, the magnitude and nature of the gap will be discussed.
Then, the hypotheses are presented and commented. This is ranked
according the above mentioned groups. One of the more promising
hypotheses relates to a stock split of Elsevier shares. The
studied period is therefore divided into the period before the
stock split, and the period round the stocksplit.
To broaden the view on the problem area, references are made to
the Unilever case, which has some similarities to the Reed-
Elsevier case. Finally, the hypotheses are summarized and some
preliminary conclusions are drawn.
2. Calculation of the gap
To get a clear insight into the amount of the mentioned gap, a
chart is presented of the price movements of both shares for the
period of October 1992-1993. This covers the period in which most
of the comments of the financial professionals were collected.
Earlier prices are not relevant since the merger took place in
October 1992. 
To make both price movements comparable the prices of Reed have to
be translated in Dutch Guilders (NLG). (A translation to GBP is
also possible; this form was chosen for convenience.) This
translation is based on the daily spot rates (closings), then this
translated prices were multiplied  by 7.69 (equalisation ratio as
per annual report 1992).
The chart (Fig. 2) reveals a gap for Elsevier with a mean value of
NLG 10.27 (for the period 1993). The correlation between both
price movements is high: 98% for the 1993 period. 
The high correlation between Reed and Elsevier prices might be
caused by a mutual benchmarking of investors in London and
Amsterdam: when considering to buy or sell shares, price movements
on the other market may be a source of information of the
(supposed) underlying market expectations.
For example: a Dutch investor considers buying Elsevier. He notes








Elsevier Reed in NLG*7.69
Fig 2. The Reed Elsevier gap in Dutch Guilders (NLG)
believe that this rise is due to a change in the general market
expectations regarding Reed Elsevier. To participate in this
probably profitable rally, he is willing to pay more than the
current level of Elsevier, which also causes an increase of the
Elsevier prices.  
The fluctuation of the gap is moderate and independent of the
heights of the prices. 
To reveal the effects of daily changes in the exchange rate I
applied moving averages of the exchange rate. The use of moving
averages for 5, 10, 20, 40 and 60 days made no significant change
in the gap.
The financial analyst at Bank van Haften Labouchere in Amsterdam
also noted the gap.
"Although it (the gap, BK) narrowed somewhat since theannouncement of the merger, this difference is still too large to
be explained by factors such as the preference individual
investors may have for Reed because of fiscal reasons. But
although there clearly seems to be room for arbitrage here, no one
seems called upon to do so. We therefore have no other choice than
to explain the gap between theory and practice to imperfect market
conditions like differences in liquidity of the two shares, a
limited readiness of investors to invest in shares of a foreign
company and costs involved in arbitrage."
Van Haften Labouchere points in this analysis three questions:
-is the gap caused by a difference in liquidity?
-why is the gap not solved by arbitrage? Are investors reluctant
to invest in foreign companies?
He considers the fiscal reason not relevant without stating that
he has actually proved this. These questions relate to
characteristics of financial markets. Let us however first
consider whether Reed and Elsevier shares are real substitutes to
each other.
3. Distortions of equalisation arrangements
3.1 Disagreement on the merger mechanics
Rinse de Jong, Director Corporate Finance of Reed Elsevier, noted
that investors may not agree to the conditions of the merger. 
An important issue in these conditions is the equalisation ratio
of 7.69. If investors perceive this term as not fair, can this
result in a discount on Elsevier prices?
I calculated the equalisation ratio which minimizes the average
gap when applied to the actual prices. This resulted in a
equalisation ratio of 7.16. This is 6.8% lower than 7.69.
However, even if investors prefer a lower equalisation ratio, the
actual ratio will be dominant. Whether or not the ratio of 7.69
reflects the real relative value of Reed to Elsevier shares, the
actual dividends and other rights are related as 1:7.69. 
If this statutory ratio is changed to, say, 1:8, based on
financial terms, the ratio of share prices should be 1:8.
Another item in the merger mechanics is the 5.8% interest of Reed
in Elsevier.
Both Reed and Elsevier have the right to 50% of the profit of theReed Elsevier companies. Owing to the 5.8% interest of Reed in
Elsevier, 5.8% of the profit that Elsevier receives is owned by
Reed. Thus Reed receives more than 50% of the profit. This agrees
with the difference in overall value of both firms at the moment
of the merger. This does however not result in a different
dividend or rights per share. The equalisation is based on a
higher level of the holding structure. 
3.2 Differences in corporate structure
Although both Reed International Plc and Elsevier NV appear to
have similar business activities, this is not necessary.
Holding shares in associated companies is the major activity, but
it need not be the only activity of these holding firms. If any
additional activities differ between Reed Plc and Elsevier NV,
this might cause the gap. These activities would remain unaffected
by the equalisation arrangements, since these activities are not a
part of the common companies, but belong to the holdings a level
higher.
Examining Reed's profit and loss account reveals that the major
component is the share of profit of Reed Elsevier combined
results, (1993: 267 mln GBP) and the profit on the 5.8% Elsevier
shares held (1993: 15 mln GBP).
Other components are taxation (73) and the correction to equal
taxes to Elsevier(12).
Obviously, Reed Plc has no other significant activities besides
holding the shares of the group.
The profit and loss account of Elsevier NV states 528 mln NLG as
its share in the profit of associated companies and 24 mln NLG
interest. This interest is received from associated companies.
This extra interest income amounts to about 4% of the share in the
profit of associated companies, but in correspondence with Rinse
de Jong, I noted that the dividing of the common profit of Reed
Elsevier to Reed and Elsevier is adjusted for these incomes. 
Thus any differences in earnings between the holdings are
eliminated.
 
3.3 Different market risk characteristics (betas)
It may be that the beta (as defined in the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM)) of Reed Elsevier on the Amsterdam exchange is
different from that on the London exchange. Betas may influence
the level of prices since the CAPM assumes a relation betweenFigure 3: Elsevier's beta
betas and demanded expected return. Since the par return for both
Reed and Elsevier is the same, demanded expected return has to be
realized by discounts on prices.
Betas for Reed and Elsevier may differ from each other.
The risk regarding the shares' fundamentals are the same for both
markets, since the fundamentals are the same. The reference to the
market return however, may cause deviating betas.
I calculated the betas for Reed and Elsevier. I used the EOE index
as the market return for Amsterdam and for London, the FTSE-100
index.
The beta is defined as:
         covariance( return of fund / market )
beta =   ---------------------------------------
         variance( return of the market )
Notes on the beta computation:
-The concept of beta is ex-ante: the returns mentioned in the
formula are expected returns. Brouwer et. al. (1992) proved that
this formula can also be used in an ex-post approach.
-Return is defined as the quotient of the price at date and the
price 3 months ago. The choice for a period of a quarter is
arbitrary. In the literature (Handa et al., 1989) indicates that
different time horizons result in different betas. The betas
calculated here should therefore not be considered as unique
values but are only intended to make movements in betas
comparable.
-A small error could be
present by omitting the
dividends. Since the
dividends of Reed and
Elsevier are equal, and




The beta of Elsevier is
sloping, with certain
waves, from -.8 to 1.4.
The Reed beta is swinging
between 0.5 and 1.6 with
long waves.  The
conformity of both betasFigure 4: Reed's beta
is rather low. Only at the end of the chart can a period of
convergence be noticed. 
The beta can give an
indication of the
conformity to market
movements. The pattern of
the Elsevier beta has a
wider variance range than
the pattern of the Reed
beta. The average beta of
Elsevier is lower than the
average of the beta of
Reed. This means that Reed
is relatively more
aggressive (beta > 1) than
Elsevier in comparison to
their respective home
market. In theory, a
higher beta requires a
higher expected return. Since earnings are equal for both stocks,
a higher expected return must be accomplished by a discount on
Reed prices. This disconfirms the discount as found in practice (a
discount on Elsevier instead of Reed).
In his annual report (1993) Mr. Vinken mentioned the popularity of
Reed resulting from its relation to the FTSE-100 index. From this
beta-analysis, one may conclude that this conformity to the local
index favours Reed compared to Elsevier. The financial option
market may try to influence the indices, or cover its positions by
trading in Reed and Elsevier ("demand from the option market").
Elsevier may be less suitable to push or pull the market index
than Reed since its pattern is less conform the index.This
uncertainty towards the conformation to index movements might
cause a discount.
4. Obstacles to arbitrage
4.1 Arbitrage
Van Haften Labouchere states that "there clearly seems to be room
for arbitrage here." There are a number of ways in which this
arbitrage could be realized.Normally, if a commodity is traded on one market at a different
price than on another market, risk free profit can be made by
purchasing the commodity on the cheaper market, shipping it to the
other market and selling it at a higher price.
In this particular case, there is the problem that the shares
cannot be transferred from one market to another. Although an
Elsevier share has the same fundamental characteristics as a Reed
share, the shares are not interchangeable (fungible). An Elsevier
share can not be traded as if it was a 7.69 Reed share. One can
buy an Elsevier share relatively cheaply, but it cannot be sold at
the Reed price. Elsevier and Reed shares remain separate entities.
Thus classical arbitrage is not possible.
An alternative form of arbitrage. 
If an investor wants to invest in Reed Elsevier, the cheapest way
is to buy Elsevier. If this strategy is followed by many
investors, the price of Elsevier will rise and prices of Reed will
fall as a result of the shifting interest from Reed to Elsevier.
This form of arbitrage is somewhat less attractive than the
classical form. In the classical case, there is a risk free profit
for anyone who wants to take it. As long as there is a difference
between both share prices, this arbitrage profit is independent of
the price movements. In the Elsevier case, the gap can be earned
without risk, but the non-systematic risk remains. If prices fall,
the investor will suffer a loss, since the investor has a long
position in Elsevier shares. Thus, this form of arbitrage is only
attractive for those who are willing to accept the non-systematic
risk of Reed-Elsevier.
In correspondence with Rinse de Jong, it has been noted that there
is a form of arbitrage. Rinse de Jong: "There is arbitrage, but
within a certain discount range. It appears that 5% and 10% are
the lower and upper limits." 
If Reed and Elsevier prices result in a gap which is located in
the lower region of the variation range, one can arbitrate by
buying a put option Elsevier and buying a call option Reed.
Since the gap is relatively small, one may expect that in the
event of an upward price change, the change in Reed will be larger
than the change in Elsevier (thus making the gap larger, away from
the lower border). The profit on the Reed call will therefore be
larger than the loss on the Elsevier put.
In the event of a decrease in prices, the decrease in Elsevier
will be larger than the decrease in Reed. Thus the profit on theFig. 5 Arbitrage moments at the Unilever gap
Elsevier put will be larger than the loss on the Reed call.
If Reed rises and Elsevier falls (which also results in an
increase of the gap), profit is made on both the Reed call and the
Elsevier put.
This strategy offers a profit opportunity which has no non-
systematic risk. This means that the return is not dependent on
the fundamentals of Reed Elsevier. The only necessary assumption
is that the gap will enlarge when it is located in the lower
region of the variation range. (The same position can be reached
by selling a Reed put and selling a Elsevier call.)
If the gap is located in the upper region of the variation range,
an inverse strategy is applicable: buy an Elsevier call and a Reed
put, or sell an Elsevier put and a Reed call.
As far as I can see, this form of arbitrage will diminish the
variation of the gap, but not necessarily the average level of the
gap. In fact, it is assumed that the gap will remain on its past
average level. Thus the average gap is a equilibrium in this
strategy.
4.1.1 Arbitrage lines
From Rinse de Jong several graphics used in his analysis werereceived, which also included analyses of the gap for Unilever and
Royal Dutch. (I have some doubts whether the Royal Dutch case is
relevant. In the annual report I found no statements regarding any
equalisation arrangements between Royal Dutch and Shell.) 
In the graphics showing the price movements arbitrage lines have
been added to show the possibilities of arbitrage. I would like to
comment on these lines.
A transaction has to be made when the price crosses one of the
lines for the first time since the last crossing of the other
line: if the price crosses one line several times without crossing
the other line, it is only a reinforcement of the last signal so
no change in position is required. Repeating the same transaction
and thereby doubling the position is not recommended: if there is
a change in the major trend, the exposure in the wrong direction
will rise quickly. Second, why should the exposure on the first
signal be smaller than the following reinforcing signals?
Applying this arbitrage rule to the Unilever graphic I count only
4 points where transactions have to be made; for Royal Dutch 5
points.
Given the period of 1986-1993 (8 years), this arbitrage is not
very intensive. To influence prices by arbitrage, more
transactions are required, so the arbitrage lines must be redrawn.
It is important to realize that the movement of gaps are not very
structured. Arbitrage is possible, but the implementation of
decision rules is not straightforward.
Some other factors may form obstacles to this arbitrage:
-The transaction costs might be too high. The gap amounts to
approximately 7.5% of the equivalent Reed price (1993). If the
difference in transaction cost for Elsevier trading exceeds this
7.5%, the net result of the shift to Elsevier will be negative.
Without knowing the exact costs of trading abroad, I am sure that
the gap is far too large to be explained by these costs.
For local markets, the costs vary from 0.2% for floorbrokers to 2%
for non-professionals.
Other costs are the research and analysis costs. For
professionals, the spot prices of Reed are as easily available as
for Elsevier (Stockdata, Reuter, Datastream). For non-
professionals who depend on newspapers or teletekst this might be
a problem (but non-professionals are less likely to arbitrage
intensively). Since the fundamentals are the same for Reed and
Elsevier, fundamental information such as annual reports and othernews is at the same effort available.
Another transaction related problem is the difference in
settlement period in Amsterdam and London, as I noted in
discussion with a broker from the Orco Bank. In Amsterdam, a seven
day settlement period is standard. In London, settlement may take
two or three weeks. This may cause interest costs problems when
applied on a fast trading frequency during arbitrage.
This is, however, a general market condition and not specific to
the Reed Elsevier case. (See the Unilever analogy.)
-Investors may be not aware of this difference. I expect that the
major brokers in Amsterdam and London are aware of this gap but
they might not want to arbitrate because of the exposure to the
non-systematical risk. Brokers normally do not expose themselves
to major positions.
On the other hand, since the gap is significant, it is worthwhile
for advisory analysts and brokers to inform their clients about
it. Rinse de Jong confirmed that some large brokers (Goldman
Sachs, Smith New Court, Barclays de Zoete Wedd) have informed the
market about the gap. However, in discussion with Mr. Blom
(Financiele Diensten Amsterdam) I noted that advisors of FDA
neglect such differences in stock prices. They focus on the
fundamentals of companies, not on potential short term excess
returns. For reasons of convenience, the clients are advised to
trade on the local (Amsterdam) stock exchange. Although indeed the
gap may be less attractive to small investors, it should be
attractive for large professional investors. Blom did not have an
explanation of long term sustained gaps like Reed Elsevier and
Unilever.
In April 1994, the annual report of Reed Elsevier was presented.
President of the board P.J. Vinken placed great emphasis on the
gap in his report .
This report got a lot of attention in the press (for example, De
Telegraaf, March 30, 1994, heading: "Elsevier executive yearning
over too low share price"). If lack of awareness is a cause, there
should be a significant change in the gap during the period
following the publication of the annual report. (In the Reed
report no special attention was given to the gap or the
equalisation arrangements.)
I prepared a chart of Reed Elsevier prices for the period January
1, 1994 - April 18, 1994 (at that points, the most recent
available data).
Price movements showed a decline in the gap, in absolute as wellas relative terms. The decline, however, did not match the date of
publication and looks, in relation to the variation history, not
significant. (This significance is examined on sight, no formal
statistics regarding significance were applied.) 
-Reluctance to invest abroad. In discussion with Mr. Wytzes from
Robeco (which did not specifically focus on the Reed Elsevier
case) I noted that the organizational structure may obstruct the
consideration of both shares: management decides in which country
how much will be invested. The portfolio manager on the level
below gives direction to the branches to be chosen, and approves
the selected shares to be bought.
Thus, the weighing of Reed versus Elsevier is not likely to be
made, since the portfolio manager who considers buying Reed is not
allowed to stray to the foreign Elsevier share, because this will
disturb the (formal) country allocation. Moreover, he will face
additional applications since he has to report this investment to
the treasury department, which controls currency exposure. 
This hypothesis was also mentioned by Mr. Vinken, and by Rinse de
Jong regarding British institutions. However, when I tried to
verify it by discussing it with Mr. Toppen, also from Robeco, I
noted that this is not the practice at Robeco.
Choices regarding allocation to countries are indeed made at a
high level, but substituting Elsevier for Reed at the operating
level is not inconvenient.
Floorbrokers at Reed Elsevier were approached for more information
on the arbitrage item, but without success (no reply).
4.2 General differences of p/e-ratios
On the stock market structural differences in price earning ratios
are not rare. In general, the price earning ratios in Amsterdam
are lower than the pe-ratios in London.
This phenomenon has been investigated by several researchers but
no sound explanation has been found yet. At Reed Elsevier, Rinse
de Jong performed an analysis on p/e-ratios. He tried to link the
share prices to their home markets and see whether the gap was
caused by a consistent price difference between London and
Amsterdam. He used p/e-ratios for the market as a whole, for the
industry groups (media) and for Reed and Elsevier. The patterns
resulting from his (limited) exercise were not clear, but the
relative standing of Reed and Elsevier vis-a-vis their peers seems
equal.The most recent conclusion in pe-ratio analysis is that we just
have to accept these differences as a fact of life.
Further exploration of this phenomenon in the Reed Elsevier case
is not worthwhile since: 
-the p/e-ratio analysis is directed on the general market
conditions, not on single shares; I doubt whether general market
conditions cause the gap (see the Unilever analogy);
-the p/e-ratio analysis tries to explain different pe-ratios for
different firms. Firms are compared on an industry basis between
two stock markets. In the Reed Elsevier case, there is a much
stronger relationship than industry resemblance: both shares are
of the same business combination.
4.3 Influences of exchange rates
There are three levels on which exchange rates may influence share
prices:
-at the moment of the merger;
-at the trading in foreign shares
-currency exposure of the company's earnings
Exchange rates at the moment of the merger:
At the time of the merger, the exchange rate of GBP/NLG played a
role in comparing economic values of both firms. After a first
estimation of the equalisation ratio, values were restated when
the GBP fell.
After the merger this applied exchange rate was no longer
relevant. It was a part of the merger transaction and after the
settlement of the exchange of mutual shares, it is a "sunk cost".
Both Reed and Elsevier have rights to 50% of the total assets of
Reed Elsevier, independent of the "price" paid for it.
Exchange rates at the trading in shares:
A British investor buying Elsevier will be exposed to currency
risk. The dividends of Reed and Elsevier are equivalent by order
of the equality commitment (including the related tax credit), but
the revenue on a sale of the Elsevier share is exposed to currency
risk. 
If a British oriented investor invests in Elsevier, he may want to
hedge his currency exposure. The purchase of Elsevier implies a
long position in Dutch Guilders (NLG), which can be offset by a
short position at the future rate of exchange. The cost of thishedge depends on the expectations of currency movements. In the
studied period the GBP was considered as a weak currency. A weak
currency will have a positive sloping term structure: as the
exchange value of GPB drops, more GBP's are required to buy NLG.
Since the investor is long in NLG, he earns a premium on a forward
contract to sell NLG. This premium lowers the costs of investment
in Elsevier. Therefore the British oriented investor would be
willing to pay even more than the translated Reed price, since
this mark-up is offset by the premium on the currency market. 
In concluding, the hypothesis works in the opposite direction of
the gap.
Currency exposure of earnings:
Since Reed Elsevier operates in several countries, both Elsevier
and Reed shareholders are exposed to currency risk. The annual
report 1993 describes the currency exposure in its section
Currency Profile. The currency profile of pre-tax profit is





The table reveals that for Dutch investors the currency exposure
is larger than for British investors, since the foreign currencies
are 1 - 0.24 = 0.76 for Dutch oriented investors and 1 - 0.39 =
0.61 for UK oriented investors. This additional currency risk may
cause the gap.  
Only the currency results on operating transactions and monetary
current assets affect net profit. In accordance with generally
accepted accounting rules, exchange translation differences on
foreign equity investments and the related foreign borrowings and
differences between balance sheet and profit and loss account
rates are taken to reserves.
Therefore the influence of the currency exposure on the
distribution of the combined profit is limited. The correlation
between the gap and the GBP/NLG exchange rate amounts to only
0.29.4.4 Liquidity
Liquidity of a financial asset is defined as the ease with which
shares can be traded. If sufficient traders are present on the
stock market, an additional demand or supply would not cause a
major price adjustment. Of course, also with large numbers of
traders, large price changes are possible, but this will be caused
by other matters, like changes in expectations of future profit or
changes of market sentiment. The marginal demand or supply is then
a relatively unimportant matter.
The overall liquidity of a share can influence prices in several
ways.
Poor liquidity can result in a major price movement when a large
party wants to buy or sell. Thus an additional cause of volatility
appears when a share is illiquid.
In general, a higher risk rate (in terms of volatility (standard
deviation)) requires a higher expected return, ceteris paribus.
(In this case, the ceteris paribus assumption ("other
circumstances equal") seems valid, as the underlying value for
Reed and Elsevier shares is the same, since both companies have a
50% interest in Reed Elsevier.) A higher expected return is
obtained if the required invested amount (i.e., the price) is
lower.
4.4.1 Measuring liquidity 
From the definition of liquidity one may relate daily volumes to
daily price movements. In a stable environment, without unexpected
changes in prospects, a characteristic of a non-liquid share is
low volume with major price movement. A characteristic of a very
liquid share is high volume with minor price movement.
Combinations of volumes and price movements for both Reed and
Elsevier are presented in a chart. This presentation of course
neglects the price effects of news coming to the market, but since
the news and the timing of it will be quite similar for both Reed
and Elsevier, a comparison remains valid. Price movements are
calculated as the absolute value of the percentage change with
respect to the previous day's closing price. Volumes are stated
according to the common definition, i.e., including double counts.
In discussion with a spokesman for the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, I
noted that the measurement of volume in Amsterdam differs
significantly from the measurement in London. In general,
Amsterdam's volumes can be divided by two to derive the actual
number of shares changing from owner. Due to the market makersystem in London which allows several forms of transaction parties
combinations, derivation of the actual numbers of shares changing
owner in London is almost impossible. The direction of any bias is
unknown. Interpretation of any comparison should therefore be very
cautious.
The chart does not reveal an obvious distinction for Reed and
Elsevier regarding the relation price movements/volumes. Only the
main corps of the scatter of Reed is located somewhat more at the
lower side of volume axis compared to Elsevier, but this may be
due to the different volume definitions. The standard deviation of
Elsevier closing prices for the period 1993 is NLG 12.33 ; for
Reed it is GBP 0.57, which is equivalent to NLG 12.16 (adjusted
for an average exchange rate of 2.78 and 7.69). The volatility of
Elsevier is therefore higher than the volatility of Reed, although
the difference might not be significant.
The patterns of the volumes of Reed and Elsevier are rather wild. 
The correlation between Reed volumes and Elsevier volumes amounts
to 0.33.
In discussion with Mr. Blom from FDA, Amsterdam, I noted that a
difference in liquidity of two stocks has to be rather large to
affect prices. Blom mentioned as example Dordtsche Petroleum, a
small, illiquid fund which consists mainly of shares Royal Dutch.
The discount on Dordtsche Petroleum is generally directed to the
illiquidity. However, both Reed and Elsevier are major funds. Blom
does not expect any influence of liquidity on Reed Elsevier stock
prices.
4.4.2 Turnover of shares
In discussion with Mr. Duffhues, Tilburg University, Department of
Business Administration, section Corporate Finance, I noted that
liquidity may be influenced by the kind of investors holding the
shares. He expects that large institutional investors have a more
buy-and-hold strategy than small investors. If a major part of the
total numbers of Elsevier shares is held by these institutional
investors, fewer shares are available for daily trading. Mr.
Duffhues expects this effect to be stronger on Elsevier than on
Reed.
The Financieele Dagblad publishes an annual overview of the
reported interest in equity and voting rights exceeding 5% by
investors in major companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock
exchange. This reporting is mandatory according to the Wet Melding
Zeggenschap. In the May 6, 1994 issue for Elsevier two reports
have been made for Elsevier: Reed International Plc: 5.79%; andING Groep: 9.42%.
Due to the threshold of 5%, long term investments below 5% are not
reported. In correspondence with Rinse de Jong I noted that
approximately 70% of the Reed shares are held by institutions.
However, since lending of stocks is common practice in London,
these shares are available for trading. Since no clear overview of
interest in Reed is available and the volumes of Reed cannot be
reliably derived, comparison of the turnover of Reed and Elsevier
is not possible.
In summary, Elsevier seems to be somewhat more liquid than Reed. 
This disconfirms the hypothesis regarding the influence of
liquidity on prices. According to this hypothesis, the liquidity
of Elsevier should be lower than the liquidity of Reed, since
Elsevier is relatively cheap to compensate for the inconvenience
of a low liquidity.
To conclude, the hypothesis that liquidity is a factor causing the
gap is not supported by the patterns of volume and price changes,
and neither by a concentration of big holdings in the Elsevier
stock. 
4.5 "Expensive" Elsevier shares
Despite the actual measured liquidity, there may be a difference
between actual liquidity and liquidity as perceived by investors.
This deviation came up when I spoke to a stock broker from Orco
Bank (the former ACC) on the subject. When I asked him if he had
an opinion on the causes of the gap, he mentioned liquidity as a
very important factor. He said it was much easier for him to trade
100,000 shares of Reed than to trade 100,000 shares of Elsevier.
This number-of-shares orientation towards liquidity ignores the
differences in the underlying values of both shares. A link may be
made to the assumed increased liquidity at stock splits in
general.
 
In discussion with Mr. Duffhues I noted that several small
investment funds avoid shares with prices above NLG 150,- and
analysts of Staal Bankiers also noted this price-of-shares
liquidity perception when dealing with Heineken NV and Heineken
holding. In my opinion, this aversion to "expensive" shares must
be caused by some sort of psychological factors. Due to fixed
transaction costs of stock trading, a minimal amount of
approximately NLG 5000.- per transaction is required to earn thesecosts back, assuming an average rate of return on stocks of 10-
15%. In relation to this NLG 5000.- a price of NLG 150 for
Elsevier is not very different from (translated) NLG 28 for Reed.
The Staal Bankiers analysts regard this attitude as irrational,
since the relative return remains the same whether NLG 10,000 is 
invested in shares costing NLG 20.- compared to NLG 10,000
invested in shares costing NLG 200.-. 
(Note that the Heineken case is not comparable to Reed Elsevier
since the absolute price difference amounts to only 11%, instead
of more than 700% (1:7.69) for Reed Elsevier. Although Heineken
Holding pays the same dividend as Heineken NV, the price of
Heineken Holding is 11% lower than the price of Heineken NV. The
analysts of Staal Bankiers recommend buying Heineken Holding to
make an additional 11% return.)
It is generally believed that when a company announces a stock
split, prices rise to a higher level. For the Dutch market, this
is verified by Van Montfort (in: Bank- en Effectenbedrijf, June
1993).
Van Montfort gives two reasons for this increase:
-the split contains implicit information about prospects;
-the liquidity of the shares increases.
 
The first reason is hard to verify, because when a stock split is
announced, often other information is also revealed, like
financial reports, mergers, changes in legal features of the
share, etc. In that case, it is hard to isolate the informative
value of the stock split. Copeland stresses the effects of this
other information. He argues that the stock split per se is not a
cause for price increases. The stock split is just an instrument
to communicate that earnings will keep increasing. Companies
decide to split stocks to keep stock prices in a presumed optimal
trading range. Copeland did not find any evidence that such an
optimal trading range exists.
To assess the increase in liquidity, Van Montfort compares the
sales amounts (volume times price) before and after the stock
split. She finds that in most of the cases the liquidity decreases
after a stock split. This confirms the findings of a similar study
by Copeland.
According to Van Montfort this may be caused by differences in the
mix of shareholders. She assumes, like Duffhues, that the
liquidity effect of a stock split is more relevant to small
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fig. 6 The Reed Elsevier gap in
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share is mostly held by small investors, the liquidity effect may
be larger. Copeland disagrees on this, since there are several
methods by which small investors can mitigate the presumed




the gap can be tested. At
the presentation of the
half year report for 1994
on August 12, a stock
split of 10:1 for the
Elsevier shares was
announced, to be effected
on October 4, 1994. This
stock split will make the
price (per share) of
Elsevier more comparable
to the price of Reed.
Like in other stock split
cases, an incidental
additional return is
expected. If this return
is due to implicit
information about the
firm's prospects, a
similar return is expected
for Reed, since the fundamentals are the same for both shares. In
that case, the gap will remain. If this return is due to a
perceived increase in liquidity, only the Elsevier share prices
will rise, resulting in a diminishing gap.   
Fig. 6 shows the development of the gap around the date of the
stock split announcement. Indeed, in August, the gap diminishes
and even becomes negative. However, this decrease is not
specifically related to the date of the stock split announcement.
In her study of Dutch companies, Van Montfort noted that only a
day before the announcement a slight rise in prices can be noted,
probably due to rumours or inside information. The expensive share
hypothesis is therefore only supported to a limited extent.
The fact that the gap decreased disconfirms the hypothesis about
the information content of a stock split, since any information onfuture earnings should influence both Reed and Elsevier in the
same manor, leaving the gap unchanged. 
5. Resemblance to other cases: Unilever
The Reed Elsevier gap might not be unique. As described in the
section regarding the pe-ratio, unexplainable price differences
are common. Fortunately, there is a case which might be very 
comparable to the Reed Elsevier case.
Unilever is also a Dutch-British combination, and has equalisation
arrangements of the same kind as Reed Elsevier. I examined the
prices of Unilever looking for possible gaps.
To make the share prices of Unilever NV in Amsterdam and Unilever
Plc in London ("Unilever Plc.") comparable, I translated Unilever
Plc. prices to NLG.
In the general notes to the 1992 financial statements it states
that, according to the equalisation arrangements, the dividend on
a face value of NLG 12,- will be equivalent to the dividend on a
face value of GBP 1,-.
Taking into account a face value per share of NLG 4,- and 5p
respectively, three shares of Unilever equal NLG 12,- and twenty
shares of Unilever Plc. equal GBP 1,-. Thus the correction
multiplier amounts to 20/3 = 6.67 ("the Unilever 7.69").
The price movements reveal periods of positive gaps (Unilever NV
cheaper than Unilever Plc.), but also periods of negative gaps and
periods of conformity. For this analysis I used a larger time
horizon: 1990 to 1993. The first chart I prepared contained only
1992 and 1993. This chart gives a misleading picture, as if the
gaps are very stable and structural. For Reed Elsevier such a time
horizon is not available since the merger took place only in 1992.
I contacted Mr. Ledeboer from Unilever. He told me that there was
not any form of intervention that Unilever has made on the stock
exchange to change the gap between Unilever NV and Unilever Plc.
He is aware of the fact that both prices do not always match, but
is not concerned about it. 
He mentioned several other cases that had similar characteristics:
for Unilever: the fund Calvé consists solely of Unilever shares
but has different price movements; others: Heineken and Heineken
Holding.
According to Mr. Ledeboer, these gaps are due to a very complex
combination of factors like liquidity, currency differences,Fig. 7: Gaps as percentage of Amsterdam prices, for the period
1990-1993
interest differences, investor's preferences, etc.
He accepted such gaps as unchangeable characteristics of the
capital market.
I prepared a set of charts to compare the patterns of the Unilver
gap to the Reed Elsevier gap. Common characteristics, if any, may
point to general market conditions causing the gaps.
The patterns of the gaps as percentage of the prices in Amsterdam
show a moderate conformity (correlation 0.61). Some influence may
be expected from general market factors such as interest, currency
exchange rate and market sentiments. 
There is, however, a fundamental difference between the monotone
positive gap between Reed and Elsevier and the positive/negative
switching gap of Unilever Plc. and -NV.This variety in gap patterns between Reed Elsevier and Unilever
gives less support to general market conditions like interest
rates, required pe-ratios and currency exposure causing the gap.
The patterns of volumes of Unilever Plc. and - NV are more similar
than the patterns of volumes of Reed and Elsevier. This may relate
to more intense arbitrage in Unilever than in Reed Elsevier. 
The characteristics of the betas of Unilever Plc. and -NV resemble
Reed Elsevier: only at the end does a period of convergence
appear. However, in this case the English firm has the widest
variation range.
From the beta analyses I can not find a fundamental difference
which might contribute to the difference in the gap of Unilever
versus Reed Elsevier.
 
6. Summary and conclusions
Equalisation arrangements made at the merger were intended to make
returns and rights on both shares equal. Reed Elsevier expected
that this would result in an equal share price.
In practice, there was a periode with a rather stable gap between
both prices. In this study I reviewed several possible causes of
this gap. These hypotheses concern distortions of the equalisation
arrangements and market conditions that prohibit arbitrage.
Hypothesis 1: Investors consider the 1:7.69 ratio not appropriate
as a basis for the merger, and make an adjustment to reach a more
acceptable ratio. 
Even if investors do not like the 1:7.69 ratio, the ratio is
enforced by the right and dividend policy. 
Hypothesis 2: different financial structures of the holdings
result in different expected returns and/or risk characteristics. 
However, the only activities of the holdings are holding the
shares of the common group. Any other income is adjusted for when
dividing the profit of the Reed Elsevier group.
Hypothesis 3: The gap is due to the general difference in p/e-
ratios between Amsterdam and London.
This general market condition aspect is contradicted by the
Unilever case. This is a similar case, but the gap is not
constant.Hypothesis 4: A difference in beta results in a correction to the
prices. 
Reed seems on the average to be more related to the market index
than Elsevier.
This creates an additional risk on Reed which may result in a
compensating discount. This hypothsis is disconfirmed by the
empirical discount on Elsevier. This hypothesis is neither
supported by the patterns of the Unilever betas.
Hypothesis 5: arbitrage resolving the gap is not performed due to:
-lack of awareness of investors;
When information regarding the gap is emphasized in the press, no
significant change in gap occurs.
-reluctance to invest abroad; 
This is not supported in discussion with investors from Robeco.
-lack of a reliable arbitrage strategy;
In this case arbitrage is not as straightforward as usual. Second,
the pattern of the gap is not easily arbitraged. However,
arbitrage is not necessary to resolve the gap. Ordinary shifts
from Reed to Elsevier are sufficient.  
-exposure to currency risk;
This is only applicable for short term investors. For longer
horizons, currency risk is hedged by the equalisation
arrangements. The correlation between the NLG/GBP exchange rate
and the gap is not high.
-transaction costs;
The gap is too large to be explained by transaction costs.
Hypothesis 6: The gap is due to different currency exposure of
Reed and Elsevier, which causes differences in the distribution of
the total profit of Reed Elsevier to Reed and Elsevier.
The exposure in NLG is indeed larger than in GBP, but due to the
accounting policy, currency results affect profit only to a
limited extent.
Hypothesis 7: The gap is due to currency exposure during trading. 
Taking into account the weak GBP, one should expect an opposite
gap.Hypothesis 8: The gap is due to general market conditions like
interest rates and acceptable p/e-ratios. If this hypothesis is
valid, a similar pattern in the gap of Unilever is expected. This
appears not to be the case.
Hypothesis 9: Elsevier is less liquid than Reed, resulting in a
discount to compensate for this inconvenience.
The general perception of investors may conform to this hypothesis
(liquidity measured in numbers of shares traded). I have however
not found statistics to support this hypothesis as based on
invested values traded. Elsevier may be perceived as less liquid
because of its relatively high price. When this price was reduced
by a stock split, the gap diminished, but this decrease started
earlier than the announcement of the stock split. Secondly, there
is no theoretical or empiric evidence supporting the generally
believed idea that stock splits increases liquidity.
Measuring the turnover of the shares is not possible due to ill-
defined volume figures on the London Stock Exchange.
In concluding, I have not found a satisfactory explanation
for the gap. However, this report may be useful for other
researchers as an introduction to the problem.
The study described in this report is limited by available time
and budget.
The most interesting points for further study are:
-perceived liquidity by investors, especially at stock splits
-view on arbitrage by investors
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